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And Wrongful Birth
by Nicolas P. Terry
Although it is not unknown for a
court to take away with one hand
that which it has just given with the
other, seldom has this been better il-
lustrated than with the recent ap-
plication of the Missouri statute of
limitations to wrongful birth ac-
tions. In Miller v. Duhart, 637
S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District was confronted
with actions brought against
medical care providers for the
allegedly negligent performance of a
sterilization procedure. Virginia
Miller, the mother of four children,
retained defendants to perform her
bilateral tube ligation. The pro-
cedure was performed on August
25, 1976. Yet on February 21, 1980 a
fifth child, Dawon, was born to the
Millers. Suit was brought against
the surgeons and the hospital by the
entire Miller family.
Missouri law is considered to be
quite liberal in its recognition of
causes of action for preconception
and pre-natal injuries.' Crucially,
however, the allegations in Miller
were not to the effect that defen-
dants' negligence caused physical in-
jury to the fetus, but rather that
their alleged negligence was, in
some way, responsible for the ex-
istence of the fetus, and hence the
child. As such, the Miller court was
asked to determine whether the law
of Missouri recognized causes of ac-
tion for what have become known
as wrongful birth and wvrongful life.
Although, as will be discussed, the
court rejected the wrongful life ac-
tion, it approved the wrongful birth
count.2 As support for this latter
holding the court described such an
action as "merely a descriptive label
for a form of malpractice," 637
S.W.2d 183 at 184. Mr. and Mrs.
Miller brought a wrongful concep-
tion action, claiming damages in-
curred before Dawon's birth as well
as additional expenses which they
would incur in raising him.5
ultimate downfall. The purpose of
this article is to examine the
holdings of the Miller court with
regard to the contended for causes
of action and to determine the ex-
tent to which the statute of limita-
tions impacts upon them.
I. The background -
wrongful birth and
wrongful life
The cases discussed herein all in-
volve a plaintiff's allegation that
defendant wrongfully caused the ex-
istence of a fetus. Thus, the most im-
portant initial distinction to be made
turns on the identity of the plaintiff.
If the action is brought by the child,
it is properly described as an action
for wrongful life. If the action is
brought by the child's parents or
sibling, it is to be labelled an action
for wrongful birth.
Although, as has been stressed,
neither allegation is premised on in-
jury caused to the fetus by defen-
dant, it does not necessarily follow
that the child will not be born in an
injured state. As such, in order to
understand the decisional law, it is
important to make a second distinc-
tion, as to whether the child is born
in a healthy or defective3 condition.
Also, it should be noted that the
term "wrongful conception" is used
by some courts to denote a par-
ticular species of "wrongful birth,"
i.e. cases in which the pregnancy
resulted from failed contraception
or sterilization, as distinguished
from, for example, failure to ter-
minate or diagnose a pregnancy.4
I. See. eg. IBrgstreser v. AMitchell 577 F.2d
22, 25-2i (8th Cir. 19781. (action fo,
negligently performed Caesarean section
resulting in premature delivery ait
daniged infant). Cf. Olejnicak v. J. 5.
%hitten, 605 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. Ct. App.
198tol in accord with State ex rel. Ihar'in
'. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d ::1i (Mo. en tIn111
19761 1wrongful deali statute ,llows
recovery only for the death of a person: a,
ftiuIs is not ai person).
2. Although in the context of discussing an
action for "wrongful conceplion" a con.
cept to lie discussed in the next section.
3. Typically, the defective condition is
caused hy a hereditary disease or a birth
defect.
4. In Miller, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188, the court
adopted the "wrongful coception" ter-
Ininology. As to these matters and also
the meaning of "wrongful pregnincy,"
see Terry, "The Right Not to he Born:
The Right Not to Give Birlh," Vol. I.
Alissouri "l'rt Low-. 57.1 I 1982 Supp.).
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II. The Miller decision
The three allegations in Miller all
concerned the birth of a healthy
Dawon Miller - there was no alle-
gation that he was born in a defec-
tive condition. Dawon himself
brought a wrongful life action; his
four siblings alleged wrongful birth,
citing, "[Tlhe loss of their mother's
and father's society, care, comfort,
and protection as well as the loss of
financial support resulting from the
birth of the additional sibling." 637
S.W.2d 183 at 184. Mr. and Mrs.
Miller brought a wrongful concep-
tion action, claiming damages incur-
red before Dawon's birth as well as
additional expenses which they
would incur in raising him.5
The court of appeals held that,
under the law of Missouri, Dawon
Miller could not bring an action for
wrongful life; dismissed the other
Miller children's claim for wrongful
birth as not "legally cognizable";
and held that, although Dawon's
parents stated a good cause of action
(for wrongful birth) it was, never-
theless, barred by the two year
limitation period provided for in
S516.105. Specifically, as to this last
point, plaintiffs made three at-
tempts to avoid the rigors of
S516.105. First, plaintiffs claimed
the statute should have begun to run
at the time of the child's birth rather
than at its conception. 6 Second,
plaintiffs argued that continuous
treatment of the mother and her
newborn sin tolled the running of
the limitations period. Finally,
plaintiffs attempted to persuade the
court to adopt a discovery rule,
which would also have tolled the
statute.7 The Miller court ultimately
rejected all three contentions.
Ill. The Statute of
Limitations
As the Miller court was forced to
conclude, S516.105 "is written with
clarity and precision." 637 S.W.2d
183 at 190. This section provides
that:
All actions against physicians,
hospitals, dentists, registered or Ii-
censed practical nurses, optometrists,
podiatrists, pharmacists, chiroprac-
tors, professional physical therapists,
and any other entity providing health
care services and all employees of any
of the foregoing acting in the course
and scope of their employment, for
damages for malpractice, negligence,
error or mistake related to health care
shall be brought within two years
from the date of occurrence of the act
of neglect complained of, except that a
minor under the full age of ten years
shall have until his twelfth birthday to
bring action, and except that in cases
in which the act of neglect complained
of is introducing and negligently per-
mitting any foreign object to remain
within the body of a living person, the
action shall be brought within two
years from the date of the discovery of
such alleged negligence, or front the
date on which the patient in the exer-
cise of ordinary care should have
discovered such alleged negligence,
whichever date first occurs, but in no
event shall any action for damages for
malpractice, error, or mistake be com-
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nenced after tile xpiration of Idn
y'ers from hile date of til e act (i f
neglect complained of.
A statute of limitations could be
viewed as no more than the doctrine
of lachess but with the requirement
of prejudice to the defendant con-
clusively presumed after the expira-
tion of the specific period contained
in the statute. As such, it is arguable
that a statute of limitation, properly
so-called, "imposes only a duty of
reasonable care upon a potential
plaintiff, not the risk of non-
discovery despite the exercise of
due diligence." Brown v. Mary
Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, 378
A.2d 1138, 1140 (N.H. 1977). Thus,
S516.105 is more aptly described as
a statute of repose; the statute clear-
ly contemplates a Miller type result
in that it is possible for the most dili-
gent of plaintiffs to have his action
statute-barred. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that the Miller court
directed the following plea to the
General Assembly - "the legisla-
ture is strongly urged to correct the
inequity which the present mal-
practice statute creates in discovery
cases other than those concerned
with foreign objects." 637 S.W.2d
183 at 190.
In some jurisdictions there have
been successful attempts at
challenging statutes of repose. See
Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), cf. Ander-
son v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 402
N.E.2d 560 (I11. 979).
However, a direct attack oil the
constitutionality of S516.105 when
applied to facts substantially the
same as in Miller has already failed,
Ros v. Kansas City General Hospital
and Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397
(Mo. 1980)9 and there seems little
chance that any such arguments will
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5. Additionally, Mr. Miller claimed
daiages for loss of consortium. Ou this
narrow issue, see Anonymous v. hospital,
35 Conn. Supp. 112, 398 A.2d 312 11979):
ef. Kingsbury %. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003
IN.1I. 1982) (husband allowed to bring
cause of action for loss of consortiuml,
6. Exactly what such a characteri7iation
would have achieved is unclear, since
S516.105, in slating that "all actions,,,
shall be brought within two years from
the date of the occurrence of the act of
neglect" (emphasis added) must clearly
be referring to the act of defendant (the
purported sterilization) and not to any
consequential act of plaintiff (e.g., the
birth).
7. The wording of S51(.105 clearly rules
otl aiyI' possibility of a special
"discovery" type rule for wrongful birth
cases. Cf, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d
512 (Tenn. 197.11, Paull . Slate of N,'w
York. 59 A.I).2d 800, 398 N.Y.S.2d 768
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977), Christ v. Lipsil.'
99 Cal. App. 3d 89.1, 16hO Cal. Rpir. 498
1979). Annot. 93 A.t,.R.3d 218.
H. T'rlhe neglect for in unreasonaile and
unexplained I'ngth of time under cir-
cuimlnc, perlniiting diligence, to do
what in law, should have beel donle."
Ialke Ite'h'tipment iitterpri'se v. Kojt'tin.
sky .110 S.W.2d 361, :167 (Mo, Ct. App.
I 9(i6i).
level. Winters v. Beck, 79 A.D.2d
706, (1980); aff'd 53 N.Y.2d 795, 54
N.Y.2d 601 (1981), cert. den. 50
USLW 3248 (Oct. 5, 1981).
IV. Exceptions to the
limitation period
It is assumed that the unpredicta-
ble nature of the human reproduc-
tive system will result in many
wrongful birth cases falling outside
the two year limitation, thus sub-
stantiating the Miller court's con-
cern with the corresponding "in-
equity." 637 S.W.2d 183 at 190.
Given, furthe'. that S516.105 is
"written with clarity and precision"
(Id. at 190) and is apparently imper-
vious to constitutional bombard-
ment, it remains for an examination
to be made as to the possible routes
that may be taken to alleviate this
singular problem. As such, a reex-
amination of the contended for
wrongful life action will be made
together with an analysis of the ap-
plication of some of the more tradi-
tional exceptions to periods of
limitations to wrongful birth ac-
tions.
A. Wrongful life
In denying Dawon Miller's claim
for wrongful life the court of ap-
peals was following a well-
established line of cases. From
.Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d
240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (ill. Ct. App.
1963), to Curlender V. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App.3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), wrongful
life actions brought by healthy
children have flourished. The at-
tractiveness of such a cause of ac-
tion in the Miller type case is, of
course, that under S516.105 the
statute of limitations is tolled for a
minor until his twelfth birthday. 10
Although a pessimistic view as to
the acceptability of the cause of ac-
tion with regard to status-based
damage claims seem reasonable,I it
does not follow that claims such as
that made by Dawon should be re-
jected so perfunctorily.
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claim before it, the Miller court used
familiar reasoning. First, the insuffi-
ciently articulated "floodgates"
argument first seen ioi Zcpeda v.
Zepeda, supra, to the effect that the
recognition of an action for wrong-
ful life would entail recognition of,
or at least encourage, suits brought
by all manner of disadvantaged per-
sons. Second, the court refers to
what it sees as the impossibility of
ascertaining damages in such a case
- a statement premised on the
unexplained presumption that this
could only be achieved by a com-
parison between existence and non-
existence. Third, the court makes
the conclusory and tautologous
holding that the defendants here
owed plaintiff no duty of care, that
plaintiff had suffered no
"cognizable injury." (637 S.W.2d
193, at 187.)
Key to any reappraisal of the
wrongful life issue decided in Miller
is an appreciation of the change in
attitude that may be detected in
some recent opinions with respect
to wrongful life cases in which the
child plaintiff was born in a defective
condition. In Speck v. Finegold, 439
A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981), suit was
brought by a child suffering from
neurofibromatosis (a congenital, in-
curable disease) against defendants
whose alleged negligence had
caused her birth (one defendant had
performed a purported vasectomy
on plaintiff's father; the other had
failed to terminate plaintiff herself).
(I. Such an llhck NOl perhaps been en.
conraged by lh attitude oIf the Supreme
court lithe ve ar hcire when il struck
dtoCwl 551, 1.15s siser hegislalioi io
Stale ,'." rt. (inlinil Ucintin Al,'m riaI
I.spital /or Chihlren v. Ga'rtitr, 538
S..V.Zd 107 IMo. 11J79)
Ill. l uissantl it is tnclear whli er flile i,-
yeuir statute tit rlmicst, co ili id al (lit
en if .of 510 .1(15 appflics oiily o "hreigo
objl"ect cases,. or als i I olilolrs: ,.g'. if]
I)awVol Mill,"s Cawe woul Ihe ltslltt
have heic lollehd 1 o til lie was Iwelve
I:elu uary 21. 1'i12) cita oily iitil Augusl
25. 1'84) (lln years Ircil itl' ml it
:itglet I c inl ciuied oII~.
II Se Tcrry, -. 'W. ai l 17.2.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was evenly divided on the question
and so the lower court's opinion was
affirmed. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d
496 (Pa. Super. 1979.) Nevertheless,
the approach taken by those on the
court in favor of permitting a
wrongful life cause of action
deserves attention. Flaherty J.
stated:
The view that we Cannot Calclate Ihe
value of existence as copiared to
nonexistence is only one sich Ihyper-
scholastic rationale used to deny it
CaUSe of action it) these cases. Those
holding such views are apparentl,
able to overlook what is plain to see:
that - ill Cases such as this - a dis.
eased plaintiff exists and, taking the
allegations of tile complaint as true,
would not exist at all hut for tie
negligence of tie defendants." .139
A.2d I 0 it a 115.
Concurring, Kauffman, J. was of
opinion that, "To permit such a
wrong to go unredressed would pro-
S. .for all the daily
legal news you and
your clients must know.
Your time is valuable and your
knowledge is invaluable. To be
sure you know all the Bench and Bar
news every day, read St. Louis' two
legal newspapers - the Daily Record and
Countian.
Our practice is accurate reporting five days a
week. Tuesday through Saturday you will find
every important fact along with interesting col-
umns about the business community.
The few minutes you spend reading may save
your case and your client.
Sist. LOUIS DAILY RECORD
4356 Duncan Ave., St. Louis, MO 63110 • 314/371-1161
S1C ST. LOUIS COUNTIAN
5003 Forsyth Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63105 • 314/7276111
vide no deterrent to professional ir-
responsibility and would be neither
just nor compatible with this Com-
monwealth's principles of tort
liability." Id at 118.
This dual approach of deterring
negligent conduct and refusing to
permit vague metaphysical
references obscure the need for a
pragmatic approach to compensa-
tion of an injured plaintiff is also
reflected in the decision of the
California appellate court in
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). It is an approach that has now
been endorsed by the California
Supreme Court in Turpin v. Sortini,
31 Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
Plaintiff in Turpin was born with a
hereditary total deafness condition.
The California Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision, permitted her to
state a cause of action against defen-
dants who had failed to diagnose the
existence of the same defect in her
elder sister prior to plaintiff's con-
ception. The major breakthrough in
Turpia was that the court was
prepared to view the wrongful life
claim as "simply one form of the
familiar medical or professional
malpractice action" (Id. at p. 342),
and that the real issue before the
court was the determination as to
what damages were recoverable.
For the Turpin court, therefore, the
resolution of whether existence (or
as the court more accurately ana-
lyzed it, existence in a defective
state) could be compared to nonex-
istence wats not dispositive of the
case. The Turpin court was thus able
to conclude that although "In this
context, a rational, nonspeculative
determination of a specific
monetary award in accordance with
normal tort principles appears to be
outside the realn of human ex-
perience" 1id. at p. 347), a remedy
was still available to plaintiff.
Although refusing to countenane a
claim for general damages, the court
did permit her to recover for the
" extraordinary, additional expenses
ST. LOUIS BAR JOURNAL
that are occasioned by the
hereditary ailment." Id. at p. 348.
The importance of the Turpin
analysis is that it should facilitate
recovery in a Miller type case,
despite the fact that the latter case is
not of the wrongful life - defective
category. The reasons for this are
threefold; first, the characterization
of the wrongful life action as "simp-
ly one form of... malpractice," Id.
at p. 342, eliminates the doctrinal
problem of whether or not a duty of
care exists. Such an approach is
reminiscent of the Miller court's ap-
proach to wrongful birth. Second,
the Turpin analysis admits of the
child having an interest in the con-
veyance of correct information to
the parents and the performance of
correct procedures.
Although in deciding whether vr not
to bear such a child parents may, prop-
erly, and undoubtedly do, take into ac-
count their own interests, parents also
presumptively consider the interests
of their future child. Thus when a
defendant negligently fails to diagnose
an hereditary ailment, he harnis the
polential child as well as the parents
b)y depriving the parents of infornia-
tion which may be necessary 1o deter-
mine whether it is in the child's own
interest to be born with defects or not
to be born at all. i. at p. 345.
Such an analysis makes clear the
crucial nexus between wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions.
Henceforth, the parents' action and
the child's action must be seen as in-
exorably linked - to recognize one
should also mean acceptance of the
other. Third, the Turpin court con-
firmed this approach by equating
and limiting the damages that the
child could recover under wrongful
life to those that its parents could in
a wrongful birth action. See I. at p.
348.
When the rationale and final
result of the Turpin case are ex-
amined, one question seems to
spring to mind - why is it necessary
for a child to have a cause of action
which essentially parallels one that
his parents have, that has the same
theoretical and conceptual basis and
that permits the award of no addi-
tional damages? An answer that
perhaps suggests itself is that it
would enable plaintiffs such as
Dawon Miller to circumvent the
trap set for his parents by S516.105.
B. Fraudulent concealment
The majority of jurisdictions
recognize that fraudulent conceal-
ment of a cause of action constitutes
an implied exception to the statute
of limitations. Such an exception
seems grounded on the general prin-
ciple of refusing to allow a defen-
dant to take advantage of his own
wrong. (See 51 Am. Jur. 2d
S146-152.) In Missouri this excep-
tion derives from a statutory tolling
provision:
If any person, by absconding or con-
cealing himself, or by any other im-
proper act, prevent the commence-
ment of an action, such action may be
commenced within the time herein
111KB
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limited, after tile commencemnit of
such actlion shall have ceased to le so
pre'venttd'. S516.2801, Mo. Rev. Stals.
There is a qualification to this pro-
vision contained in S516.300:
Tihe' provisions of sections 516.01) to
51(.370 shall not exltend to any action
which is or shall be otherwise limited
li. ally statute; but such action shall he
broug ht within the time hiled by
such statilte.
Despite the existence of a "special"
statutory provision (now S516.105),
relating to the medical malpractice
limitation period, Missouri courts
have been consistent in holding that
this is insufficient to trigger
S516.300 and that the fraudulent
concealment tolling provision is
therefore capable of application in
medical malpractice cases. See e.g.
Kauchick v. Williams, 435 S.W.2d
342 (Mo. 1968), Brewington v.
Rlo'saikulthi, 584 S.W.2d 112 (Mo.
0. i\pp. 1979), .,nile v. Lawson, 435
S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1968), Swope '.
Priniz. 468 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1971).
In Swope v. Printz the supreme
court first delineated the six con-
stituents that plaintiff must show in
order to establish fraudulent con-
cealnent so as to toll the statute of
limitation.
(I that in performing the surgery
defendent did or railed to do some-
thing which causes tlhet paralysis: (2}
that defendent's conduct failed to
meet the required standards of profes-
sional competence and therefore con-
stituted negligence; 131 that defendant
had actual knowledge that lie caused
the paralysis; 141 that with that





postoperative conduct and statements
to conceal from plaintiffs the fact that
they had a claim against him for meal.
practice by reason thereof; (5) that
defendent's acts were fraudulent; and
(6) that plaintiffs were not guilty of
lack of diligence in not sooner ascer-
taining the truth with respect to the
situation. 468 S.W.2d 34 at 38-9.
When applied to a wrongful birth
allegation of the Miller type, it is
clear that it is the second and third
constituents that raise issues of most
crucial importance. 2  Missouri
courts appear to be liberal in their
interpretation of these two constitu-
ents in medical malpractice cases.
In Kauchick v. Williams, 435 S.W.2d
342 (Mo. 1968) and Smile v. Lawson,
435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1968), the
Missouri Supreme Court appeared
to be close to favoring the position
that mere silence by a physician can
trigger the concealment provision.
Certainly these majority opinions
provoked a strong concurrence to
the contrary in Smile v. Lawson, 435
S.W.2d at pp. 329-332. The liberal
approach as to this constituent has
been continued in Martin %'. Barbour,
358 S.W.2d 200, 210-211 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) and Brewington %.
Raksakulthi 584 S.W.2d 112, 115
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
In neither Kauchick nor Smile
however would the court shade the
requirement of "actual knowledge"
so as to formally alter the constit-
uent to, for example, "should have
known." Nevertheless, in Smile the
court did appear to view the constit-
uent as a jury issue, and one capable
of being established by inference
from the available evidence, 435
S.W.2d at 328. This approach seems
to have been confirmed in Swope v.
Printz, 468 S.W.2d 34, 42, Mat-ii v.
Barbeur, 588 S.W.2d 200, 209-210
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977 and Brewington
%. Raksakulthi, 584 S.W.2d 112, 115
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
The advantages of a liberal ap-
proach to fraudulent concealment in
typical wrongful birth cases may
readily be appreciated from refer-
ence to Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M.
143, 530 P.2d 407 (N.M. Ct.
App, 1974), in which the court
tolled the applicable statute of
limitations in a case concerning an
allegedly negligently performed
tubal ligation, even though the
defendant was silent as to the mat-
ter and apparently the only evi-
dence of his knowledge of the inef-
fectiveness of the procedure was
that a pathology report to that effect
was on file. See also Leagan v.
Levine, 158 Ga. App. 293 (1981).
C. Continuous treatment
Missouri also accepts continuous
treatment as a tolling provision
under the medical malpractice
statute of limitations. In Thatcher v.
DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo.
1943) the court was of the opinion
that:
the ovt'rwheluing weight of authority
is that where the facts are as discloseid
in plaintiff's petition I post-op,'rative
care by same doctor for two years
foillowilig aplpendectomy the statute
of limitations does not begini to run un-
tl thei Ireatment of plaintiff's ailmenit
by (Ite defendant ceases.
Shaw v. Clugh, 597 S.W.2d 212 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980) concerned the al-
leged negligence of defendant in ob-
taining bone plugs for cervical fu-
sion from plaintiff's right thigh.
During the course of this procedure
plaintiff's lateral femoral cutaneous
nerve became entrapped. The ques-
tion for the court thus became
whether the statute of limitations
ran from the time of the perfor-
mance of the original operation or
from the later corrective surgery.
Key to this issue and to the decision
of the court of appeals that the
limitation period in Shaw ran from
the time of the later treatment is
that the court looks to the treatment
12. 1I1 and 121 would have to lie stablished
for there to beiy malpractice action at
all: 1611 can hie presuietdh ina case such as
miller where plai atiffs could hardly hav
htivi mort diliget: 15) is at least
arguably a conclusion lrawn from tli t
xisltlice of 1 iland I-) rather hum an ili.
dtelliladell collstituntl.
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as a whole. The emphasis is not so
much on continued treatment, but
rather on the fact that the treatment
has not yet terminated.
Clearly the facts as disclosed in
Miller were insufficient to justify a
holding of continuous treatment
(637 S.W.2d at 190) - the later treat-
ment was with regard to a "related
matter"and that doctor was not
even one of defendants, thus defy-
ing any characterization as to non-
termination of that particular
patient-physician relationship.
However, continuous treatment is
an effective route where the ex-
istence of test procedures can be
demonstrated. Examples from the
wrongful birth area would include
biopsy of tissue (in the case of a
bilateral tubal ligation, see eg., Har-
din v. Farris, 530 P.2d 407 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1974), and sperm counts (in
the case of vasectomy, see e.g.
Hack worth v. Hart, 474. S.W.2d 377
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971)). More general-
ly, a court will occasionally hold the
relationship to be continued where
there are post-operative appoint-
ments or other follow-up pro-
cedures (e.g., Savitz v. Funk, 64 Ohio
App. 2d 29 (1979).
D. Contract action
There seems little doubt that a
wrongful birth action based on
alleged malpractice such as in Miller
could be brought on a contract
theory - breach of an implied term
as to the possession of reasonable
skill and care. See, Louisell and
Williams, Vol. 1, Medical Malpractice
§8.03 (1981). It seems equally as
true, however, that bringing action
on such an implied term will not
avoid the rigors of S516.105. State ex
rel. Sisters of St. Mary v. Campbell,
511 S.W.2d 141, 146-47 (Mn. Ct.
App. 1974).
The inclusion of such an implied
warranty in S516.105 would not ap-
pear to be dispositive of an argu-
ment that defendant made an ex-
press warranty to achieve a particu-
lar result - in a Miller type case,
sterilization. That such a warranty
may be made seems clear. Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41
(1957), Mason v. Western Pennsyl-
vania Hospital, 428 A.2d 1366, 1368
11981). It is certainly arguable that
the breach of such a warranty could
occur with or without the "malprac-
tice, negligence, error or mistake"
of the physician and thus would fall
outside S516.105; such a guarantee
would rather be governed by the
period of limitations applying to
contractual actions, §516.120. It is
arguable that express warranties of
sterility made pre-operatively do
not need to be supported by addi-
tional consideration. Rather, the
issue seems to be narrowed to the
identification of sufficient evidence
to support a finding of warranty. As
was stated in Sard v. Hard, 379
A.2d 1014, 1027 (Md. Ct. App.
1977), plaintiff must establish the
existence of such a warranty "by
clear and convincing evidence."
Plaintiff's burden is a heavy one. In
Stephens v. Spiak, 233 N.W.2d 124
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975), there is the
suggestion that a physician's state-
ment to the effect that the chances
of becoming pregnant were "one in
a million" was sufficient to under-
mine plaintiff's allegation of war-
ranty of sterility.
V. Conclusion
While it is tempting to agree with
the conclusion of Miller court that it
is for the legislature to deal with this
problem, it should, nevertheless, be
conceded that S516.105 is unlikely
to be altered.
As such, the inequities of a Miller
type result must be avoided through
more conventional means. By
recognizing the action for wrongful
life, by permitting plaintiff to sue on
an express warranty theory and by
demonstrating a liberal approach to
the existing exceptions to the statute
of limitations, some much needed
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